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Abstract. In this paper we study dynamic pricing mechanism of contingent claims.
A typical model of such pricing mechanism is the so-called g–expectation E
g
s,t[X ]
defined by the solution of the backward stochastic differential equation with generator
g and with the contingent claim X as terminal condition. The generating function
g this BSDE. We also provide examples of determining the price generating function
g = g(y, z) by testing.
The main result of this paper is as follows: if a given dynamic pricing mechanism
is Egµ–dominated, i.e., the criteria (A5) Es,t[X] − Es,t[X
′] ≤ Egµ [X −X ′] is satisfied
for a large enough µ > 0, where gµ = µ(|y|+ |z|), then Es.t[·] is a g–pricing mechanism.
This domination condition was statistically tested using CME data docoments. The
result of test is significantly positive.
Keywords: BSDE, nonlinear expectation, dynamic pricing mechanism, g–
expectation, nonlinear evaluation, g-martingale, nonlinear martingale, Doob-
Meyer decomposition.
MSC 2000 Classification Numbers: 60H10, 60H05,
1 Introduction
There are a lot of data of the processes of prices of huge variety of contingent
claims, vanilla options, exotic options, etc. Each process corresponds the price
of a specific contingent claim issued in a specific market and offered by a specific
financial institution. A typical example is the call and put options with a specific
stock price as their underlying asset. We can find the real time data of of the
option price Ct, t ≥ t0 for a call option CT = (ST − k)
+ with T as its maturity.
There exist many processes of prices of this specific product, e.g., the bid price,
the ask price, the we-buy price and we-sell price by a market maker under a
specific background, etc. The main point of view of this paper is, behind a price
process, there is a pricing mechanism. Take the above option market price Ct for
example, there exists a mapping Et,T [·] from ΛT the space of option price states
at time T to Λt at the time t ∈ [t0, T ] such that Ct is produced by Et,T [CT ].
This family of mapping
Et,T [X ] : X ∈ ΛT 7−→ Λt, t ≤ T
2
forms the pricing mechanism for this specific option market prices.
Black-Scholes formula can be regarded as a dynamic pricing mechanism of
contingent claim. In fact, it can be regarded as to solve a specific linear backward
stochastic differential equation (BSDE). More generally, each BSDE with a given
generating function g forms a dynamic model of pricing mechanism of contingent
claims.
In this paper we explain the following result: if an a dynamic pricing mech-
anism is dominated by gµ–pricing mechanism, with large enough µ > 0, then
it is a g–pricing mechanism: there exists a unique generating function g, such
that the price of the pricing mechanism is solved by the corresponding BSDE.
In this case, to find the corresponding generating function g by using data of
the pricing process is a very interesting problem, since g determines entirely
the pricing mechanism. The domination condition can be tested also by data
analysis of the price processes.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the the notion of
Ft–consistent pricing mechanisms in subsection 2.1. We then give a concrete Ft–
pricing mechanism: Eg–pricing mechanisms in subsection 2.2. The main result,
Theorem 3.1, will be presented in section 3. We also provide some examples
and explain how to find the function g through by testing the input–output
data. This main theorem will be proved in Section 9. Nonlinear decomposition
theorems of Doob–Meyer’s type, i.e., Proposition 4.13 and Theorem 8.1 play
crucial roles in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Theorem 8.1 has also an interesting
interpretation in finance (see Remark 8.2).
The crucial domination inequality (3.1) of our main result Theorem 3.1 is
tested by using data of parameter files, provided by CME, for options based on
S&P500 futures. The result strongly support that the option pricing mechanism
of CME is a g–pricing mechanism.
Another application of the dynamical expectations and pricing mechanisms
is to risk measures. Axiomatic conditions for a (one step) coherent risk measure
was introduced by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath 1999 [2] and, for a convex
risk measure, by Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) [26]. Rosazza Gianin (2003) studied
dynamical risk measures using the notion of g–expectations in [45] (see also [41],
[3], [4]) in which (B1)–(B4) are satisfied. In fact conditions (A1)-(A4), as well
as their special situation (B1)–(B4) provides an ideal characterization of the
dynamical behaviors of a the a risk measure. But in this paper we emphasis the
study of the mechanism of the pricing mechanism to a further payoff, for which
is, in general, the translation property in risk measure is not satisfied.
2 The pricing mechanisms and g–pricing mech-
anism by BSDE
2.1 Basic setting
We assume that the price S of the underlying assets is driven by a d–dimensional
Brownian motion (Bt)t≥0 in a probability space (Ω,F , P ). We don’t need to
3
precise the model of St, what we assume here is that the information FSt of the
price S coincides with that of the Brownian motion:
FSt = Ft := σ{Bs, s ≤ t}
For each t ∈ [0,∞), the state of contingent prices will be given in the following
space
• Λt = L2(Ft) :={the space of all real valued Ft–measurable random vari-
ables such that E[|X |p] <∞}.
Definition 2.1 A system of operators:
Es,t[X ] : X ∈ L
2(Ft)→ L
2(Fs), T0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T1
is called an Ft–consistent pricing mechanism defined on [T0, T1] if it satisfies the
following properties: for each T0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T1 and for each Xt, X ′t ∈ L
2(Ft),
(A1) Es,t[Xt] ≥ Es,t[X ′t], a.s., if Xt ≥ X
′
t, a.s.;
(A2) Et,t[Xt] = Xt, a.s.;
(A3) Er,s[Es,t[Xt]] = Er,t[Xt], a.s.; for r ≤ s
(A4) 1AEs,t[Xt] = 1AEs,t[1AXt], a.s. ∀A ∈ Fs.
We will often consider (A1)–(A4) plus an additional condition:
(A40) Es,t[0] = 0, a.s. ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
Remark 2.2 The raison we use the letter Es,t[·] to denote the above pricing
mechanism is that its behavior is very like the conditional expectation E[Xt|Fs]
for a Ft–measurable random variable. It is wise profit this similarity to introduce
the notion of E-martingales which are the data of the processes of option prices
produced by this pricing mechanism.
Remark 2.3 (A1) and (A2) are economically obvious conditions. Condition
(A3) means that the value Es,t[Xt] can be regarded as a contingent claim at the
maturity s. The price of this contingent claim at the time r ≤ s is Er,s[Es,t[Xt]].
It have to be the same as the price Er,t[Xt].
Remark 2.4 The meaning of condition (A4) is: at time s, the agent knows
whether IA worthes 1. If it is 1, then the price Es,t[1AXt] must be the same as
Es,t[Xt].
Proposition 2.5 (A4) plus (A40) is equivalent to
(A4’) 1AEs,t[X ] = Es,t[1AX ], a.s. ∀A ∈ Fs.
Proof. . It is clear that (A4’) implies (A4). Es,t[0] ≡ 0 can be derived by
putting A = ∅ in (A4’). On the other hand, (A4) plus the additional condition
implies
1ACEs,t[1AX ] = 1ACEs,t[1Ac1AX ] = 0.
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We thus have
Es,t[1AX ] = 1AC1AEs,t[X ] + 1A1AEs,t[X ]
= 1AEs,t[X ].
Proposition 2.6 (A4) is equivalent to, for each 0 ≤ s ≤ t and X,X ′ ∈ L2(Ft),
Es,t[1AX + 1ACX
′] = 1AEs,t[X ] + 1ACEs,t[X
′], a.s. ∀A ∈ Fs. (2.1)
Proof. (A4) ⇒ (2.1): We let Y = 1AX + 1ACX
′. Then, by (A4)
1AEs,t[Y ] = 1AEs,t[1AY ] = 1AEs,t[1AX ] = 1AEs,t[X ].
Similarly
1ACEs,t[Y ] = 1ACEs,t[1ACY ] = 1ACEs,t[1ACX
′] = 1ACEs,t[X
′].
Thus (2.1) from 1AEs,t[Y ] + 1ACEs,t[Y ] = 1AEs,t[X ] + 1ACEs,t[X
′].
(2.1) ⇒ (A4): It is simply because of
1AEs,t[1AX ] = 1AEs,t[1AX + 1AC (1AX)]
= 1A(1AEs,t[X ] + 1ACEs,t[1ACX ])
= 1AEs,t[X ].
Remark 2.7 At time t, the agent knows the value of 1A. (A4) means that,
if, ω ∈ A, i.e.., 1A(ω) = 1 then the value Es,t[1AX ] should be the same as
Es,t[X ] since the two outcomes X(ω) and (1AX)(ω) are exactly the same. (A4)
is applied to the pricing mechanism of a final outcome X plus some “dividend”
(Ds)s≥0.
An immediate property of this dynamical pricing mechanism is that they
can be pasted together, one after the other to form a new dynamical pricing
mechanism:
Proposition 2.8 Let T0 < T1 < T2 < · · · < TN be given and, for i =
0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, let Eis,t[·], Ti ≤ s ≤ t ≤ Ti+1 be an Ft–consistent pricing
mechanism on [Ti, Ti+1] in the sense of Definition 2.1. Then there exists a
unique Ft–consistent pricing mechanism E[·] defined on [T0, TN ]
Es,t[X ] : X ∈ L
2(Ft)→ L
2(Fs), T0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ TN
such that, for each i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, and for each Ti ≤ s ≤ t ≤ Ti+1,
Es,t[X ] = E
i
s,t[X ], ∀X ∈ L
2(Ft). (2.2)
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Proof. It suffices to prove the case N = 2, since we then can apply this result
to the cases [T0, T3] = [T0, T2] ∪ [T2, T3], · · · and finally [T0, TN ] = [T0, TN−1] ∪
[TN−1, TN ].
We define
Es,t[X ] =


E
1
s,t[X ] T0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T1;
E
2
s,t[X ], T1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T2;
E
1
s,T1
[E2T1,t[X ]] T1 ≤ s < T1 < t ≤ T2.
(2.3)
It is clear that, on [T0, T2], Es,t[·] satisfies (A1) and (A2). To prove (A3) it
suffices to check the relation
Er,s[Es,t[X ]] = Er,t[X ], T0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T1
for two cases: T0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ T1 ≤ t ≤ T2 and T0 ≤ r ≤ T1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T2. For the
first case
Er,s[Es,t[X ]] = E
1
r,s[E
1
s,T1
[E2T1,t[X ]]]
= E1r,T1 [E
2
T1,t
[X ]]
= Er,t[X ].
For the second case
Er,s[Es,t[X ]] = E
1
r,T1
[E2T1,s[E
2
s,t[X ]]]
= E1r,T1 [E
2
T1,t
[X ]]
= Er,t[X ].
We now prove (A4). Again it suffices to check the case T0 ≤ s ≤ T1 ≤ t ≤ T2.
In this case, for each A ∈ Fs ⊂ FT1 , (A4) is derived from
1AEs,t[X ] = 1AE
1
s,T1
[E2T1,t[X ]]
= 1AE
1
s,T1
[1AE
2
T1,t
[X ]]
= 1AE
1
s,T1
[E2T1,t[1AX ]]
= 1AEs,t[1AX ].
It remains to prove the uniqueness of E[·]. Let Ea[·] be an Ft–consistent pricing
mechanism such that,
E
a
s,t[X ] = E
i
s,t[X ], ∀X ∈ L
2(Ft), i = 1, 2.
We then have, when T0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T1 and T1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T2, Eas,t[X ] ≡
Es,t[X ], ∀X ∈ L2(Ft). For the remaining case, i.e., T0 ≤ s < T1 < t ≤ T1, since
E
a satisfies (A3),
E
a
s,t[X ] = E
a
s,T1
[EaT1,t[X ]]
= E1s,T1 [E
2
T1,t
[X ]]
= Es,t[X ], ∀X ∈ L
2(Ft).
Thus Eas,t[·] = Es,t[·]. This completes the proof.
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2.2 Dynamic pricing mechanism generated by BSDE
We need the following notations. Let p ≥ 1 and t ∈ [0,∞) be given.
• Lp(Ft;Rm) :={the space of all Rm–valued Ft–measurable random vari-
ables such that E[|ξ|p] <∞};
• LpF(0, t;R
m) :={Rm–valued and predictable stochastic processes such that
E
∫ t
0
|φs|pds <∞};
• DpF (0, t;R
m) :={all RCLL processes in LpF(0, t;R
m) such that E[sup0≤s≤t |φs|
p] <
∞};
• SpF (0, T ;R
m) :={all continuous processes in DpF (0, T ;R
m) };
In the case m = 1, we denote them by Lp(Ft), L
p
F(0, t), D
p
F (0, t) and
S
p
F(0, t). We recall that all elements in D
2
F (0, T ) are predictable.
For each given X ∈ L2(Ft), we solve the following BSDE on [0, t]:
Ys = X +
∫ t
s
g(r, Yr, Zr)dr −
∫ t
s
ZrdBr, (2.4)
where the unknown is the pair of the adapted processes (Y, Z). Here the function
g is given
g : (ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω× [0,∞)×R×Rd → R.
It satisfies the following basic assumptions for each ∀y, y′ ∈ R, z, z′ ∈ Rd
{
g(·, y, z) ∈ L2F(0, T ), ∀T ∈ (0,∞),
|g(t, y, z)− g(t, y′, z′)| ≤ µ(|y − y′|+ |z − z′|) .
(2.5)
In some cases it is interesting to consider the following situation:
{
(a) g(·, 0, 0) ≡ 0,
(b) g(·, y, 0) ≡ 0, ∀y ∈ R.
(2.6)
Obviously (b) implies (a). This BSDE (2.4) was intrduced by Bismut [5], [6] for
the case where g is a linear function of (y, z). Pardoux and Peng [33] obtained
the following result (see Theorem 4.3 for a more general situation): for each
X ∈ L2(Ft), there exists a unique solution (Y, Z) ∈ S2F (0, t) × L
2
F(0, t;R
d) of
the BSDE (2.4).
Definition 2.9 We denote by Egs,t[Xt] := Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t. We thus define a
system of operators
E
g
s,t[·] : L
2(Ft)→ L
2(Fs), 0 ≤ s ≤ t <∞. (2.7)
(Egs,t[·])0≤s≤t<∞ is called g–expectation.
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Proposition 2.10 Let the generating function g satisfies (2.5). Then
E
g
s,t[X ] : X ∈ L
2(Ft)→ L
2(Fs), 0 ≤ s ≤ t <∞
defined in (2.7) is an Ft–consistent pricing mechanism, called g–pricing mech-
anism, i.e., it satisfies (A1)–(A4) of Definition 2.1.
This pricing mechanism is entirely generated by function g. We then call g
a (contingent claim) price generating function.
Proof. This result is a special case of Proposition 4.9.
Since g satisfies Lipschitz condition with Lipschitz constant µ, it is then
dominated by the following function
gµ(y, z) := µ|y|+ µ|z|, (y, z) ∈ R×R
d (2.8)
in the following since
g(t, y, z)− g(t, y′, z′) ≤ gµ(y − y
′, z − z′).
We will see that the above notion of domination is useful. Briefly speaking,
a price generating function g is dominated by another one if and only if the
corresponding pricing mechanism Eg is dominated by the other one.
3 Main result: Es,t[·] is governed by a BSDE
From now on the system Es,t[·]0≤s≤t<∞ is always a fixed Ft–consistent pricing
mechanism, i.e., satisfying (A1)–(A4), with additional assumptions (A40) and
the following Egµ–domination assumption:
(A5) there exists a sufficiently large number µ > 0 such that, for each
0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
Es,t[X ]− Es,t[X
′] ≤ E
gµ
s,t[X −X
′], ∀X,X ′ ∈ L2(Ft), (3.1)
where the function gµ(y, z) = µ|y|+ µ|z| is given in (2.8).
The main theorem of this paper is:
Theorem 3.1 We assume that the function g satisfies (2.5) with g(·, 0, 0) = 0.
Then the g–expectation Egs,t[·]0≤s≤t<∞ is an Ft–consistent pricing mechanism
satisfying (A1)–(A4), (A40) and the domination condition (A5). E
g is then
called g–(contingent claim) pricing mechanism, and the function g is called a
(contingent claim) price generating function.
Conversely, let Es,t[·]0≤s≤t<∞ be an Ft–consistent pricing mechanism satisfying
(A1)–(A4), (A40) and the domination condition (A5), then there exists a unique
price generating function g(ω, t, y, z) satisfying (2.5) with g(·, 0, 0) ≡ 0, such that
Es,t[X ] = E
g
s,t[X ], ∀s ≤ t, ∀X ∈ L
2(Ft). (3.2)
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Remark 3.2 The case where Es,t[·] satisfy (A1)–(A5), without (A40), can be
obtained as corollaries of the this main theorem. In this more general situation
the condition g(s, 0, 0) ≡ 0 is not imposed. The main result of [11]
We consider some special situations of our theorem.
Example 3.3 If moreover, g(s, y, 0) ≡ 0. Then, by [36], (A2’) holds. Thus,
according to Proposition 2.5, Egs,t[·] becomes an Ft–consistent nonlinear expec-
tation:
E[X |Ft] = Eg[X |Ft] := E
g
s,t[X ] = E
g
s,T [X ].
This is so called g–expectation introduced in [36].
This extends non trivially the result obtained in [11], (see also [41] for a
more systematical presentation and explanations in finance), where we needed
a more strict domination condition plus the following assumption
E[X + η|Ft] = E[X |Ft] + η, ∀η ∈ Ft.
Under these assumptions we have proved in [11] that there exists a unique
function g = g(s, z), with g(s, 0) ≡ 0, such that Eg[X ] ≡ E[X ] = E[X |F0].
Example 3.4 Consider a financial market consisting of d+1 assets: one bond
and d stocks. We denote by P0(t) the price of the bond and by Pi(t) the price
of the i-th stock at time t. We assume that P0 is the solution of the ordinary
differential equation: dP0(t) = r(t)P0(t)dt, and {Pi}di=1 is the solution of the
following SDE
dPi(t) = Pi(t)[bi(t)dt +
∑d
j=1
σij(t)dB
j
t ],
Pi(0) = pi, i = 1, · · · , d.
Here r is the interest rate of the bond; {bi}
d
i=1 is the rate of the expected return,
{σij}di,j=1 the volatility of the stocks. We assume that r, b, σ and σ
−1 are
all Ft–adapted and uniformly bounded processes on [0,∞). Black and Scholes
have solved the problem of the market pricing mechanism of an European type
of derivative X ∈ L2(FT ) with maturity T . In the point of view of BSDE, the
problem can be treated as follows: consider an investor who has, at a time t ≤ T ,
n0(t) bonds and ni(t) i-stocks, i = 1, · · · , d, i.e., he invests n0(t)P0(t) in bond
and πi(t) = ni(t)Pi(t) in the i-th stock. π(t) = (π1(t), · · · , πd(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
is an Rd valued, square-integrable and adapted process. We define by y(t) the
investor’s wealth invested in the market at time t:
y(t) = n0(t)P0(t) +
∑d
i=1
πi(t).
We make the so called self–financing assumption: in the period [0, T ], the in-
vestor does not withdraw his money from, or put his money in his account yt.
Under this condition, his wealth y(t) evolves according to
dy(t) = n0(t)dP0(t) +
∑d
i=1
ni(t)dPi(t).
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or
dy(t) = [r(t)y(t) +
∑d
i=1
(bi(t)− r(t))πi(t)]dt +
∑d
i,j=1
σij(t)πi(t)dB
j
t .
We denote g(t, y, z) := −r(t)y −
∑d
i,j=1(bi(t) − r(t))σ
−1
ij (t)zj. Then, by the
variable change zj(t) =
∑d
i=1σij(t)πi(t), the above equation is
−dy(t) = g(t, y(t), z(t))dt− z(t)dBt.
We observe that function g satisfies (2.5). It follows from the existence and
uniqueness theorem of BSDE (Theorem 4.3) that for each derivative X ∈ L2(FT ),
there exists a unique solution (y(·), z(·)) ∈ L2F(0, T ;R
1+d) with the terminal
condition yT = X. This meaning is significant: in order to replicate the deriva-
tive X, the investor needs and only needs to invest y(t) at the present time
t and then, during the time interval [t, T ] and then to perform the portfolio
strategy πi(s) = σ
−1
ij (s)zj(s). Furthermore, by Comparison Theorem of BSDE,
if he wants to replicate a X ′ which is bigger than X, (i.e., X ′ ≥ X, a.s.,
P (X ′ ≥ X) > 0), then he must pay more, i.e., there this no arbitrage opportu-
nity. This y(t) is called the Black–Scholes price, or Black–Scholes pricing mech-
anism, of X at the time t. We define, as in (4.6), Egt,T [X ] = yt. We observe that
the function g satisfies (b) of condition (2.6). It follows from Proposition 4.9
that Egt,T [·] satisfies properties (A1)–(A4) for Ft–consistent pricing mechanism.
Example 3.5 An very important problem is: if we know that the pricing mech-
anism of an investigated agent is a g–pricing mechanism Eg, how to find this
price generating function g. We now consider a case where g depends only on z,
i.e., g = g(z) : Rd → R. In this case we can find such g by the following testing
method. Let z¯ ∈ Rd be given. We denote Ys := E
g
s,T [z¯(BT − Bt)], s ∈ [t, T ],
where t is the present time. It is the solution of the following BSDE
Ys = z¯(BT −Bt) +
∫ T
s
g(Zu)du−
∫ T
s
ZudBu, s ∈ [t, T ].
It is seen that the solution is Ys = z¯(Bs −Bt) +
∫ T
s
g(z¯)ds, Zs ≡ z¯. Thus
E
g
t,T [z¯(BT −Bt)] = Yt = g(z¯)(T − t),
or
g(z¯) = (T − t)−1Egt,T [z¯(BT −Bt)]. (3.3)
Thus the function g can be tested as follows: at the present time t, we ask the
investigated agent to evaluate z¯(BT −Bt). We thus get E
g
t,T [z¯(BT −Bt)]. Then
g(z¯) is obtained by (3.3).
Remark 3.6 The above test works also for the case g : [0,∞) ×Rd → R, or
for a more general situation g = γy + g0(t, z).
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An interesting problem is, in general, how to find the price generating func-
tion g by a testing of the input–output behavior of Eg[·]? Let b : Rn 7−→ Rn,
σ¯ : Rn 7−→ Rn×d be two Lipschitz functions.
Xt,xs = x+
∫ s
t
b(Xt,xr )dr +
∫ s
t
σ(Xt,xr )dBr, s ≥ t.
The following result was obtained in Proposition 2.3 of [7].
Proposition 3.7 We assume that the price generating function g satisfies (2.5).
We also assume that, for each fixed (y, z), g(·, y, z) ∈ D2F(0, T ). Then for each
(t, x, p, y) ∈ [0,∞)×Rn ×Rn ×R, we have
L2– lim
ǫ→0
1
ǫ
[Egt,t+ǫ[y + p · (X
t,x
t+ǫ − x)] − y] = g(t, y, σ
T (x)p) + p · b(x).
4 Pricing an accumulated contingent claim with
E
g–pricing mechanisms
Definition 4.1 An accumulated contingent claim (X,K) ∈ L2(FT )×D2F(0, T )
with maturity T is a contract, according which the writer have to pay the buyer
X at T and. in each time interval [s, t] ⊂ [0, T ], Kt −Ks.
Remark 4.2 We understand that, in a real life, X should be non negative
and K non decreasing. But we will see that we can treat the general situation
(X,K) ∈ L2(FT )×D2F(0, T ), without any mathematical obstacle.
We consider the following BSDE on [0, t] with given terminal condition X ∈
L2(Ft) and an RCLL process K ∈ D2F(0,∞):
Ys = X +Kt −Ks +
∫ t
s
g(r, Yr, Zr)dr −
∫ t
s
ZrdBr, s ∈ [0, t]. (4.1)
When K is an increasing (resp. decreasing) process, the solution (Y, Z) is called
a g–supersolution (resp. g–subsolution). These type of solutuions appear very
often in superhedging problem in the pricing of contingent claims in an incom-
plete markets, where one need to find the smallest g–supersolutuion (resp. the
largest g–subsolution) to replicate X . We first recall the following basic results
of BSDE.
Theorem 4.3 ([33], [35]) We assume (2.5). Then there exists a unique solu-
tion (Y, Z) ∈ L2F(0, t;R×R
d) of BSDE (4.1). We denote it by
(Y t,X,Ks , Z
t,X,K
s ) = (Ys, Zs), s ∈ [0, t]. (4.2)
We have
Y t,X,K +K ∈ S2F(0, t).
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Proof. In [33] (see also [24]), the result of BSDE is for t = T and Kt =
∫ t
0
φsds
for some φ ∈ L2F(0, T ). The present situation can be treated by setting (see
[36])
Y¯s := Ys +Ks,
g¯(s, y, z) := g(s, y −Ks, z)1[0,t](s)
(4.3)
and considering the following equivalent BSDE
Y¯s = X +Kt +
∫ T
s
g¯(r, Y¯r, Zr)dr −
∫ T
s
ZrdBr, s ∈ [0, T ]. (4.4)
It is clear that Y¯s ≡ X + Ks, Zs ≡ 0on [t, T ]. Since g¯ is a Lipschitz function
with the same Lipschitz constant µand
g¯(·, 0, 0) = g(·,−K·, 0)1[0,t](·) ∈ L
2
F(0, T ),
thus, by [33], [35], the BSDE (4.4) has a unique solution (Y¯ , Z).
We introduce a new notation.
Definition 4.4 We denote, for s ≤ t,
E
g
s,t[X ;K·] := Y
t,X,K
s (4.5)
E
g
s,t[X ] := E
g
s,t[X ; 0]. (4.6)
This notion generalizes that of Egs,t[·] in Definition 2.9. Clearly when (2.6)–(a)
is satisfied, we have Egs,t[0] = E
g
s,t[0; 0] = 0, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
Remark 4.5 In fact, for each maturity T ≥ 0 the price process of the ac-
cumulated contingent claim (X,K) ∈ L2(FT ) × D2F(0, T ) produced by E
g[·] is
E
g
s,T [X ;K], s ≤ T . We will prove it for a more general price mechanism E[·],
see the next subsection.
Remark 4.6 About the notations Eg[·]. This notation was firstly introduced in
[36] in the case where g satisfies (2.6)–(b). In this situation it is easy to check
that
E
g
s,t[X ] ≡ E
g
s,T [X ], ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T.
In other words, Eg–is a nonlinear expectation, called g–expectation. The general
situation, i.e., without (2.6) was introduced in [35] and [16].
By the above existence and uniqueness theorem, we have for each 0 ≤ r ≤
s ≤ t and for each X ∈ L2(Ft) and K ∈ D2F (0, T ),
E
g
r,s[E
g
s,t[X ;K·];K·] = E
g
r,t[X ;K·], a.s. (4.7)
It is also easy to check that, with the notation g−(t, y, z) := −g(t,−y,−z)
− Egs,t[X ;K·] = E
g−
s,t [−X ;−K·]. (4.8)
We will see that {Egt,T [X ]}0≤t≤T , X ∈ L
2(FT ) form an Ft–consistent nonlin-
ear pricing mechanism. The following monotonicity property is the comparison
theorem of BSDE.
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Theorem 4.7 We assume (2.5). For each fixed maturity let for let (X,K) and
(X ′,K ′) ∈ L2(Ft) ×D2F (0, T ) be two accumulated contingent claims satisfying
X ≥ X ′ and that K −K ′ is an increasing process. Then we have
E
g
s,t[X ;K·] ≥ E
g
s,t[X
′;K ′· ], ∀s ≤ t. (4.9)
In particular,
E
g
s,t[X ] ≥ E
g
s,t[X
′]. (4.10)
If A ∈ D2F(0, T ) is an increasing process, then
E
g
s,t[X ;A·] ≥ E
g
s,t[X ]. (4.11)
Proof. The case Kt ≡ K ′t ≡ 0 is the classical comparison theorem of BSDE.
The present general situation, see [35] or [41].
We recall the special price generating function gµ(y, z) defined in (2.8). It
is a very strong generating function. In fact we have
Corollary 4.8 The g–pricing mechanism Eg is dominated by Egµ in the fol-
lowing sense: for each t ≥ 0, let (X,K) and (X ′,K ′) ∈ L2(Ft) ×D
2
F(0, T ) be
two accumulated contingent claims with maturity t, then we have
E
g
s,t[X ;K·]− E
g
s,t[X
′;K ′· ] ≤ E
gµ
s,t[X −X
′;K· −K
′
· ] (4.12)
where µ is the Lipschitz constant of g given in (2.5). In particular, since gµ the
generating function gµ itself has Lipschitz constant µ, we have
E
gµ
s,t[X ;K·]− E
gµ
s,t[X
′;K ′· ] ≤ E
gµ
s,t[X −X
′;K· −K
′
· ] (4.13)
Proof. By the definition, The pricing processes produces by Ys = E
g
s,t[X ;K·]
and Y ′s = E
g
s,t[X
′;K ′· ] solve respectively the following BSDEs on [0, t]:
Ys = X +Kt −Ks +
∫ t
s
g(r, Yr, Zr)dr −
∫ t
s
ZrdBr,
Y ′s = X
′ +K ′t −K
′
s +
∫ t
s
g(r, Y ′r , Z
′
r)dr −
∫ t
s
Z ′rdBr.
We denote Yˆ = Y − Y ′, Zˆ = Z − Z ′ and
Kˆt = Kt −K
′
t +
∫ t
0
[−gµ(Yˆs, Zˆs) + g(s, Ys, Zs)− g(s, Ys, Zs)]ds.
Then (Yˆ , Zˆ) solves a new BSDE
Yˆs = X −X
′ + Kˆt − Kˆs +
∫ t
s
gµ(r, Yˆr, Zˆr)dr −
∫ t
s
ZˆrdBr.
We compare it to the BSDE
Y¯s = X −X
′ + (K −K ′)t − (K −K
′)s +
∫ t
s
gµ(r, Y¯r, Z¯r)dr −
∫ t
s
Z¯rdBr.
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Since d(K − K ′ − Kˆ)s ≥ 0, thus, by comparison theorem, i.e., Theorem 4.7,
Y¯s ≥ Yˆs = Ys − Y ′s . We thus have (4.12).
It is very interesting to observe that, given a price generating function g,
E
g
s,t[·;K·] is again an Ft–consistent pricing mechanism:
Proposition 4.9 Let the generating function g satisfies (2.5) and for a fixed
K ∈ D2F(0,∞),
E
g
s,t[X ;K·] : X ∈ L
2(Ft)→ L
2(Fs), 0 ≤ s ≤ t <∞ (4.14)
defined in (4.5) is an Ft–consistent pricing mechanism, i.e., it satisfies (A1)–
(A4) of Definition 2.1.
Proof. (A1) is given by (4.9). (A2) is clearly true by the definition. (A3) is
proved by (4.7). We now consider (A4), i.e., for each t and X ∈ L2(Ft), we have
1AE
g
s,t[X ;K·] = 1AE
g
s,t[1AX ;K·], ∀s ≤ t, A ∈ Ft. (4.15)
as well as
1AE
g
s,t[X ;K·] = E
gs,A
s,t [1AX ;K
s,A
· ], ∀A ∈ Ft, (4.16)
where we set
gs,A(t, y, z) := 1[0,s)(t)g(t, y, z) + 1[s,T ](t)1Ag(t, y, z), (4.17)
K
s,A
t := 1[0,s)(t)Kt + 1[s,T ](t)1A(Kt −Ks). (4.18)
We will give the proof of (4.15). The proof of (4.16) is similar. According to
BSDE (4.1) for each time r ∈ [s, t], Yr := E
g
r,s[X ;K·] and Y¯r := E
g
s,t[1AX ;K·]
solve respectively
Yr = X +Kt −Kr +
∫ t
r
g(r, Yu, Zu)du −
∫ t
r
ZudBu,
and
Y¯r = 1AX +Kt −Kr +
∫ t
r
g(u, Y¯u, Z¯u)du−
∫ t
r
Z¯udBu
Wemultiply 1A, A ∈ Fs on both sides of the above two BSDEs. Since 1Ag(r, Yr, Zr) =
1Ag(r, Yr1A, Zr1A), we have
1AYr = 1AX + 1AKt − 1AKr +
∫ t
r
1Ag(u1AYu, 1AZu)du−
∫ t
r
1AZudBu,
and
1AY¯r = 1AX + 1AKt − 1AKr +
∫ t
r
1Ag(u1AYu, 1AZu)du−
∫ t
r
1AZ¯udBu.
It is clear that 1AYr and 1AY¯r satisfy exactly the same BSDE with the same
terminal condition on [s, t]. By uniqueness of BSDE, 1AYr ≡ 1AY¯r on [s, t], i.e.,
1AE
g
s,t[X ;K·] ≡ 1AE
g
s,t[1AX ;K·]. The proof is complete.
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If Y is the data of a price process produced by some contingent claim pricing
mechanism, in many situations it is practically meaningful and financially inter-
esting to compare this data by using a given g–pricing mechanism. One typical
situation is that the price produced by Eg is weaker (resp. stronger). In this sit-
uation Y is called a g–supermartingale (resp. g–submartingale). Here the term
“g–martingale” is a nonlinear, and nontrivial generalization of the classical one,
due to the similarity between the classical conditional expectation E[·|Fs] and
E
g
s,t[·]: .
Definition 4.10 Let K ∈ D2F (0,∞) be given. A process Y ∈ D
2
F(0,∞) is
said to be an Eg[·;K]–martingale (resp. Eg[·;K]–supermartingale, Eg[·;K]–
submartingale) if for each 0 ≤ s ≤ t
E
g
s,t[Yt;K·] = Ys, (resp. ≤ Ys, ≥ Ys). (4.19)
Clearly a Eg–martingale Y is a price process produced by this pricing mech-
anism: Ys = E
g
s,T [YT ], s ≤ T .
Remark 4.11 If (y, z) ∈ L2F(0, T ;R×R
d) solves the BSDE
ys = yt +Kt −Ks +
∫ t
s
g(r, yr, zr)dr −
∫ t
s
zrdBr, s ≤ t.
It is clear that (−y,−z) solves
−ys = −yt + (−Kt)− (−Ks)
+
∫ t
s
[−g(r,−(−yr),−(−zr))dr −
∫ t
s
(−zr)dBr.
Thus, if y is an Eg[·;K·]–martingale (resp. E
g[·;K]–supermartingale, Eg[·;K]–
submartingale), then −y is an Eg∗s,t[·;−K·]–martingale (resp. E
g∗ [·;K]–submartingale,
E
g∗ [·;K]–supermartingale), where we denote
g∗(t, y, z) := −g(t,−y,−z).
Therefor many results concerning Eg[·;K]–supermartingales can be also applied
to situations of submartingales.
Example 4.12 Let X ∈ L2(FT ) and A ∈ D2F(0, T ) be given such that A is an
increasing process. By the monotonicity of Eg, i.e., Theorem 4.7, we have, for
t ∈ [0, T ],
Yt := E
g
t,T [X ] = E
g
t,T [X ; 0] is a E
g–martingale,
Y +t := E
g
t,T [X ;A] is a E
g–supermartingale,
Y −t := E
g
t,T [X ;−A] is a E
g–submartingale.
As in classical situations, an interesting and hard problem is the inverse
one: if Y is an Eg–supermartingale, can we find an increasing and predictable
process A such that Yt ≡ E
g
t,T [X ;A]? This nonlinear version of Doob–Meyer’s
15
decomposition theorem will be stated as follows. It plays a crucially important
role in this paper.
We have the following Eg–supermartingale decomposition theorem of Doob–
Meyer’s type. This nonlinear decomposition theorem was obtained in [38]. But
the formulation using the notation Egt,T [·;A] is new. In fact we think this is the
intrinsic formulation since it becomes necessary in the more abstract situation
of the E–supermartingale decomposition theorem, i.e., Theorem 8.1 which can
considered as a generalization of the following result.
Proposition 4.13 We assume (2.5)–(i) and (ii). Let Y ∈ D2F(0, T ) be an E
g–
supermartingale. Then there exists a unique increasing process A ∈ D2F(0, T )
(thus predictable) with A0 = 0, such that
Yt = E
g
t,T [YT ;A], ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.20)
Corollary 4.14 Let K ∈ D2F(0, T ) be given and let Y ∈ D
2
F (0, T ) be an
E
g[·;K]–supermartingale in the following sense
E
g
s,t[Yt;K] ≤ Ys, ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T. (4.21)
Then there exists a unique increasing process A ∈ D2F(0, T ) with A0 = 0, such
that
Yt = E
g
t,T [YT ;K +A], ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.22)
Proof. By the notations of (4.3) with t = T , we have
E
g
s,t[Yt;K] +Ks = E
g¯
s,t[Yt +Kt]. (4.23)
It follows that (4.21) is equivalent to
E
g¯
s,t[Yt +Kt] ≤ Ys +Ks, ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T. (4.24)
In other words, Y +K is an Eg¯–supermartingale in the sense of (4.19). By the
above supermartingale decomposition theorem, Proposition 4.13, there exists
an increasing process A ∈ D2F (0, T ) with A0 = 0, such that
Yt +Kt = E
g¯
t,T [YT +KT ;A], ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T, (4.25)
or, equivalently (4.22).
5 Characterization of g-pricing mechanism by
its generating function g
For a price mechanism Eg[·], it is important to distinct her selling price and buy-
ing price. We now fix that Eg[·] is the selling price. A rational price mechanism
must be
E
g[X ] ≥ −Eg[−X ].
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It also possesses some other properties, such as convexity, or moreover, sub-
additivity. See [2], [3], [4], [9], [23], [24], [26], [28], [37], [45], etc. for the
ecomomic meanings. An interesting question is: what the corresponding gen-
erating function g will behaves if the the Eg satisfies the above properties. We
will see that g perfectly reflects the behavior of Eg. This will be very important
for using data of the pricing processes to statistically find g. We begin with
introducing some technique lemmas.
Let a functions f : (ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] × R × Rd → R satisfy the same
Lipschitz condition (2.5) as for g. For each n = 1, 2, 3, · · · , we set
fn(s, y, z) :=
2n−1∑
i=0
f(s, Y
tni ,y
s , z)1[tni ,tni+1)(s), s ∈ [0, T ] (5.1)
tni = i2
−nT, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 2n. (5.2)
It is clear that fn is an Ft–adapted process.
For each fixed (t, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R × Rd, we consider the following SDE of
Itoˆ’s type defined on [t, T ]:
Y t,y,zs = y −
∫ s
t
f(r, Y t,y,zr , z)dr + z(Bs −Bt) (5.3)
We have the following classical result of Itoˆ’s SDE.
Lemma 5.1 We assume that f satisfies the same Lipschitz condition (2.5) as
for g. (2.5). Then there exists a constant C, depending only on µ, T and
E
∫ T
0 |f(·, 0, 0)|
2ds, such that, for each (t, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R×Rd, we have
E[|Y t,y,zs − y|
2] ≤ C(|y|2 + |z|2 + 1)(s− t), ∀s ∈ [t, T ]. (5.4)
Proof. It is classic that E
∫ T
0 |f(r, Y
t,y,z
r , z)|dr
2 ≤ C0(|y|
2 + |z|2 + 1), where
C0 depends only on µ, T and E
∫ T
0
|f(·, 0, 0)|2ds. We then have
E[|Y t,y,zs − y|
2] ≤ 2E[|
∫ s
t
f(r, Y t,y,zr , z)dr|
2] + 2|z|2(s− t)
≤ 2E[|
∫ s
t
f(r, Y t,y,zr , z)dr|
2] + 2|z|2(s− t)
≤ 2E[
∫ s
t
|f(r, Y t,y,zr , z)|
2dr](t − s) + 2|z|2(s− t)
≤ C(|y|2 + |z|2 + 1)(s− t).
Lemma 5.2 For each fixed (y, z) ∈ R×Rd, {fn(·, y, z)}∞n=1 converges to f(·, y, z)
in L2F(0, T ), i.e.,
lim
n→∞
E
∫ T
0
|fn(s, y, z)− f(s, y, z)|2ds = 0. (5.5)
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Proof. For each s ∈ [0, T ), there are some integers i ≤ 2n − 1 such that
s ∈ [tni , t
n
i+1). We have, by (5.4)
E[|fn(s, y, z)− f(s, y, z)|2] = E[|f(s, Y
tni ,y
s , z)− f(s, y, z)|
2]
≤ µ2E[|Y
tni ,y,z
s − y|
2]
≤ µ2C(|y|2 + |z|2 + 1)2−nT.
Thus {fn(·, y, z)}∞n=1 converges to f(·, y, z) in L
2
F(0, T ).
Lemma 5.3 Let f : (ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] × R × Rd → R satisfies the same
Lipschitz condition (2.5) as for g. If for each (t, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R×Rd, we have
f(ω, r, Y t,y,zr , z) ≥ 0 (resp. = 0), (ω, r) ∈ [t, T ]× Ω, .dr × dP -a.s..
Then We then, for each (y, z) ∈ R×Rd
f(ω, t, y, z) ≥ 0, (resp. = 0), (ω, t) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, .dt× dP -a.s.. (5.6)
Proof. Let us fix y and z. We define fn(s, y, z) as in (5.1). It is clear that,
fn(r, y, z) ≥ 0, (resp. = 0), (ω, r) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, .dr × dP a.s.
But from Lemma 5.2 we have fn(·, y, z)→ f(·, y, z), in L2F(0, T ) as n→∞. We
thus have 5.6.
We need the following inverse comparison theorem which generalizes the
results of [7] and [10] in the sense that g does not need to be continuous, or
right continuous, in time. We thus finally obtain an equivalent conditions under
the standard condition (2.5) of BSDE. We notice that this result was obtained
by already by [30] and [31]. Here we will use a very different method that will
be applied in the proof of our main theorem.
Proposition 5.4 Let g, g¯ : (ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× R×Rd → R be two price
generating functions satisfying (2.5). Then the following two conditions are
equivalent:
(i) g(ω, t, y, z) ≥ g¯(ω, t, y, z), ∀(y, z) ∈ R×Rd, dP × dt a.s.
(ii) The corresponding pricing mechanisms Eg[·], Eg¯[·] satisfy
E
g
s,t[ξ] ≥ E
g¯
s,t[ξ], ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t, ∀ξ ∈ L
2(Ft)
Proof. The method of the proof is significantly different from [7] and [10].
The part (i)⇒(ii) is simply from the standard comparison theorem of BSDE.
We now prove the part (ii)⇒(i). For each fixed (t, y, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R × Rd,
the solution (Y t,y,zs )s∈[t,T ] of SDE with f = g is a g¯–supermartingale. By the
decomposition theorem, there exists an increasing process A ∈ D2F(0, T ) such
that
Y t,y,zs = y −
∫ s
t
g¯(r, Y t,y,zr , z)dr − (As −At) + z(Bs −Bt),
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Comparing this with Y t,y,zs = y −
∫ s
t
g(r, Y t,y,zr , z)dr + z(Bs −Bt), we have
g(r, Y t,y,zr , z) ≥ g¯(r, Y
t,y,z
r , z), a.e, in [t, T ], a.s..
We then can apply Lemma 5.3 to obtain (i).
Corollary 5.5 The following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) The price generating function g satisfies. for each (y, z) ∈ R×Rd,
g(t, y, z) ≥ −g(t,−y,−z), a.e., a,s,,
(ii) Egs,t[·] : L
2(Ft) 7−→ L
2(Fs) is a seller’s pricing mechanism, i.e., for each
0 ≤ s ≤ t , Egs,t[ξ] ≥ −E
g
s,t[−ξ], for each ξ ∈ L
2(Ft).
Proof. We denote g¯(t, y, z) := −g(t,−y,−z) and compare the following two
BSDE:
Ys = ξ +
∫ t
s
g(r, Yr, Zrdr −
∫ t
s
ZrdBr, s ∈ [0, t],
and
Y¯s = ξ +
∫ t
s
g¯(r, Y¯ , Z¯r)dr −
∫ t
s
Z¯rdBr, s ∈ [0, t].
By the above Proposition, one has Egs,t[·] ≥ E
g¯
s,t[·], iff g ≥ g¯. This with E
g¯
s,t[ξ] =
−Egs,t[−ξ] yields (i) ⇔ (ii).
Proposition 5.6 The following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) The price generating function g = g(t, y, z) is convex (resp. concave) in
(y, z), i.e., for each (y, z) and (y′, z′) in R×Rd and for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]
g(s, αy + (1 − α)y′, αz + (1 − α)z′) ≤ αg(s, y, z) + (1− α)g(s, y′, z′), a.s.
(resp. ≥ αg(s, y, z) + (1− α)g(s, y′, z′), a.s.).
(ii) The corresponding pricing mechanism Egs,t[·] is a convex (resp. concave),
i.e., for each fixed α ∈ [0, 1], we have
E
g
s,t[αξ + (1− α)ζ] ≤ αE
g
s,t[ξ] + (1− α)E
g
s,t[ζ], a.s. (5.7)
(resp. ≥ αEgs,t[ξ] + (1− α)E
g
s,t[ζ], a.s.)
∀s ≤ t, ∀ξ, ζ ∈ L2(Ft).
Proof. We only prove the convex case.
(i)⇒(ii): For a given t > 0, we set Y ξs := E
g
s,t[ξ], Y
ζ
s := E
g
s,t[ζ], s ∈ [0, t]. These
two pricing processes solve respectively the following two BSDEs on [0, t]:
Y ξs = ξ +
∫ t
s
g(r, Y ξr , Z
ξ
r )dr −
∫ t
s
ZξrdBr,
Y ζs = ζ +
∫ t
s
g(r, Y ζr , Z
ζ
r )dr −
∫ t
s
Zζr dBr.
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Their convex combination: (Ys, Zs) := (αY
ξ
s + (1 − α)Y
ζ
s , αZ
ξ
s + (1 − α)Z
ζ
s ),
satisfies
Ys = αξ + (1− α)ζ +
∫ t
s
[g(r, Yr, Zr) + ψr]dr −
∫ t
s
ZrdBr,
where we set ψr = αg(r, Y
ξ
r , Z
ξ
r ) + (1− α)g(r, Y
ζ
r , Z
ζ
r )− g(r, Yr, Zr).
But since the price generating function g is convex in (y, z), we have ψ ≥ 0.
It then follows from the comparison theorem that Ys ≥ E
g
s,t[αξ + (1 − α)ζ], for
each. We thus have (ii).
(ii)⇒(i): Let Y t,y,z be the solution of SDE (5.3). For fixed t ∈ [0, T ) and (y, z),
(y′, z′) in R×Rd, we have
Y t,y,zs = E
g
s,t[Y
t,y,z
t ], Y
t,y′,z′
s = E
g
s,t[Y
t,y′,z′
t ].
We set Ys := αY
t,y,z
s + (1− α)Y
t,y′,z′
s , s ∈ [t0, T ]. By (5.7),
E
g
s,t[Yt] ≤ αE
g
s,t[Y
t,y,z
s ] + (1 − α)E
g
s,t[Y
t,y′,z′
s ]
= αY t,y,zs + (1− α)Y
t,y′,z′
s
= Ys.
Thus the process Y is a g–supermartingale defined on [t, T ]. It follows from
the decomposition theorem, i.e., Theorem 4.13, that, there exists an increasing
process A ∈ D2F(t, T ) such that
Ys = Yt −
∫ s
t
g(r, Yr, Zr)dr − (As −At) +
∫ s
t
ZrdBs.
We compare this with
Ys = αY
t,y,z
s + (1− α)Y
t,y′,z′
s
= αy + (1 − α)y′ −
∫ s
t
[αg(r, Y t,y,zr , z) + (1− α)g(r, Y
t,y′,z′
r , z
′)]dr
+ (αz + (1− α)z′)(Bs −Bt),
It follows that
Yt = αy + (1− α)y
′, Zr ≡ αz + (1− α)z
′,
g(r, Yr, Zr) ≡ g(r, αY
t,y,z
r + (1 − α)Y
t,y′,z′
r , αz + (1− α)z
′).
Thus we have
g(s, αY t,y,zs +(1−α)Y
t,y′,z′
s , αz+(1−α)z
′) ≤ αg(s, Y t,y,zs , z)+(1−α)g(s, Y
t,y′,z′
s , z
′).
We then can apply Lemma 5.3 to obtain (i).
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Proposition 5.7 The following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) The price generating function g is positively homogenous in (y, z) ∈ R×Rd,
i.e.,
g(t, λy, λz) = λg(t, y, z), a.e., a,s,,
(ii) The corresponding pricing mechanism Egs,t[·] : L
2(Ft) 7−→ L
2(Fs) is posi-
tively homogenous: for each 0 ≤ s ≤ t , i.e., Egs,t[λξ] = λE
g
s,t[ξ], for each λ ≥ 0
and ξ ∈ L2(Ft).
Proof. (i)⇒(ii) is easy.
(ii)⇒(i): Let Y t,y,z be the solution of SDE (5.3). For fixed t ∈ [0, T ) and (y, z)
in R × Rd, we have λY t,y,zs = E
g
s,t[λY
t,y,z
t ], s ∈ [t, T ]. This implies that, there
exists Zt,y,z,λ· ∈ L2F(t, T ;R
d), such that
λY t,y,zs = λy −
∫ s
t
g(r, λY t,y,zr , Z
t,y,z,λ
r )dr +
∫ s
t
Zt,y,z,λr dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
Compare this with λY t,y,zs = λy−
∫ s
t
λg(r, Y t,y,zr , z)dr+
∫ s
t
λzdr, it follows that
Z
t,y,z,λ
· ≡ λz and λg(r, Y t,y,zr , z) ≡ g(r, λY
t,y,z
r , Z
t,y,z,λ
r ), r ∈ [t, T ]. We then can
apply Lemma 5.3 to obtain (i).
From the above two propositions we immediatly have
Corollary 5.8 The following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) The price generating function g is subadditive: for each (y, z), (y′, z′) ∈
R×Rd,
g(ω, t, y + y′, z + z′) ≤ g(ω, t, y, z) + g(ω, t, y′, z′), dt× dP , a.s.,
(ii) The corresponding pricing mechanism Egs,t[·] : L
2(Ft) 7−→ L2(Fs) is is
subadditive: for each 0 ≤ s ≤ t ,
E
g
s,t[ξ + ξ
′] ≤ Egs,t[ξ] + E
g
s,t[ξ
′], ∀ξ, ξ′ ∈ L2(Ft).
Proposition 5.9 The price generating function g is independent of y if and
only if, the corresponding g–pricing mechanism is cash invariant, namely, for
each s ≤ t
E
g
s,t[ξ + η] = E
g
s,t[ξ] + η, a.s., ∀ξ ∈ L
2(Ft), η ∈ L
2(Fs).
Proof. We first prove the “If” part. For each fixed (y, z) ∈ R × Rd, we have
Y t,y,zs ≡ E
g
s,T [Y
t,y,z
T ] ≡ y + E
g
s,T [Y
t,y,z
T − y]. Let Y¯s = E
g
s,T [Y
t,y,z
T − y], s ∈ [0, T ]
and Z¯ be the corresponding part of Itoˆ’s integrand. By Y¯r ≡ y+Y t,y,zr it follows
that
y + Ys = y + Y
t,y,z
T +
∫ T
s
g(r, Y t,y,zr , z)−
∫ T
s
zdBr
= (y + Y t,y,zT ) +
∫ T
s
g(r, Y¯r, Z¯r)−
∫ T
s
Z¯rdBr.
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Thus Z¯r ≡ z and
g(r, Y t,y,zr , z) ≡ g(r, Y
t,y,z
r − y, Z¯r) ≡ g(r, Y
t,y,z
r − y, z).
We then can apply Lemma 5.3 to obtain that, for each (y, z) ∈ R×Rd,
g(r, y, z) ≡ g(r, y − y, z) ≡ g(r, 0, z).
Namely, g is independent of y.
“Only if part”: For each for each s ≤ t and ξ ∈ L2(Ft), η ∈ L2(Fs), we have
Yr := E
g
s,t[ξ + η] = ξ + η +
∫ t
r
g(u, Zu)du−
∫ t
s
ZudBu, r ∈ [s, t].
Thus Y¯r := Yr − η is a g–solution on [s, t] with terminal condition Y¯t = ξ + η.
This implies
E
g
s,t[ξ] + η = Y¯s = E
g
s,t[ξ + η].
The proof is complete.
We consider the following self–financing condition:
E
g
s,t[0] ≡ 0, ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t. (5.8)
Proposition 5.10 Eg[·] satisfies the self–financing condition if and only if its
price generating function g satisfies
g(t, 0, 0) = 0, a.e., a.s.
Proof. The “if” part is obvious.
The “only if part”: Yt := E
g
t,T [0] ≡ 0, implies
Yt ≡ 0 ≡ 0 +
∫ T
t
g(s, 0, Zs)ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdBs, t ∈ [0, T ].
Thus Zs ≡ 0 and then g(s, 0, Zs) = g(s, 0, 0) ≡ 0.
Zero–interesting rate condition:
E
g
s,t[η] = η, ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t <∞, η ∈ L
2(Fs).
Proposition 5.11 Eg[·] satisfies the zero–interesting rate condition if and only
if its price generating function g satisfies, for each y ∈ R,
g(·, y, 0) = 0.
Proof. For a fixed y ∈ R, we consider Ys := E
g
s,T [y] ≡ y. Let Zs be the
corresponding Itoˆ’s integrand
Yt = y +
∫ T
t
g(s, Ys, Zs)−
∫ T
t
ZsdBs ≡ y.
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But this is equivalent to
Yt ≡ y, Zs ≡ 0, g(s, y, 0) ≡ 0.
For each z¯i0· ∈ L
2
F(0, T )
Et,T [ξ] +
∫ t
0
z¯i0s dB
i0
s = Et,T [ξ +
∫ T
t
z¯i0s dB
i0
s ] (5.9)
Proposition 5.12 Condition 5.9 holds if and only if g(s, y, z) does not depends
on the i0th component z
i0 of z ∈ Rd.
Proof. The “if” part: Since process Yt := Et,T [ξ] solves the following BSDE
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
g(s, Ys, Zs)ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdBs,
we have
Yt +
∫ t
0
z¯i0s dB
i0
s = ξ +
∫ T
0
z¯i0s dB
i0
s +
∫ T
t
g(s, Ys, Zs)ds−
∫ T
t
Z¯sdBs,
where
Z¯s =
(
Z1s , · · · , Z
i0−1
s , Z
i0
s + z¯
i0
s , Z
i0+1
s , · · · , Z
d
s
)
.
But since g(s, y, z) does not depend the i0th component of z ∈ Rd, we thus have
g(s, Ys, Zs) ≡ g(s, Ys, Z¯s). Thus
Yt +
∫ t
0
z¯i0s dB
i0
s = ξ +
∫ t
0
z¯i0s dB
i0
s +
∫ T
t
g(s, Ys, Z¯s)ds−
∫ T
t
Z¯sdBs.
This means that (5.9) holds.
The “only if” part: For each fixed (t, y, z), let (Y t,y,zs )s≥t be the solution of
(5.3). We have,
Es,T [Y
t,y,z
T ]− z
i0Bi0s = Es,T [Y
t,y,z
T − z
i0Bi0T ], s ∈ [t, T ].
Since the process Yr := Es,r[Y
t,y,z
r − z
i0
r B
i0
r ], r ∈ [t, s], solves the BSDE
Y t,y,zs − z
i0Bi0s = Ys = Y
t,y,z
T + z
i0Bi0T +
∫ T
s
g(r, Yr, Zr)ds−
∫ T
s
ZrdBr.
From which we deduce Zs = z¯ :=
(
z1, · · · , zi0−1, 0, zi0+1, · · · , zd
)
= z and thus
g(r, Yr, Zr) = g(r, Y
t,y,z
r , z¯) = g(r, Y
t,y,z
r , z), 0 ≤ t ≤ r ≤ T.
It then follows from Lemma 5.3 that
g(t, y, z¯) = g(t, y, z), t ≥ 0, a.e., a.s.,
i.e., g does not depend the i0th component of z ∈ Rd.
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Proposition 5.13 The following condition are equivalent:
(i) For each 0 ≤ s ≤ t, and X ∈ L2(Fst ), the g–pricing mechanism E
g
s,t[X ] is
deterministic;
(ii) The corresponding pricing generating function g is a deterministic function
of (t, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R×Rd.
The proof is similar as the others. We omit it.
6 Pricing accumulated contingent claim by a gen-
eral Es,t[·]
For a given K ∈ D2F (0,∞), we will find the corresponding definition Es,t[·;K],
for an abstract dynamic pricing mechanism Es,t[·] defined on [0,∞). To this end
we first consider the case K ∈ D0F(0,∞), the space of step processes defined by
D0F(0,∞) := {Kt =
N−1∑
i=0
ξi1[ti,ti+1)(t), {ti}
T
i=0 ∈ π
N
[0,∞), ξi ∈ L
2(Fti)}. (6.1)
Now let Kt =
∑N−1
i=0 ξi1[ti,ti+1)(t) be fixed. We observe that, for each T > 0
and X ∈ L2(FT ), (X,K) is an accumulated contingent claim with maturity T
in a simple way that, at each time ti ≤ T , the buyer of the contract (X,K)
receives Kti −Kti−, and, in addition, she or he receives X at the maturity T .
We define, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ N−1, s, t ∈ [ti, ti+1], with s ≤ t andX ∈ L2(Ft),
E
i
s,t[X ;K] := Es,t[X +Kt −Ks].
Lemma 6.1 For each i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, Es,t[·;K], ti ≤ s ≤ t ≤ ti+1 is an
Ft–consistent pricing mechanism.
Proof. It is easy to check that (A1), (A2) and (A3) holds. We now prove
(A4), i.e., for each ti ≤ s ≤ t ≤ ti+1 and X ∈ L
2(Ft),
1AE
i
s,t[X ;K] = 1AE
i
s,t[1AX ;K], ∀A ∈ Fs. (6.2)
We have
1AE
i
s,t[X ;K·] = 1AEs,t[X +Kt −Ks]
= 1AEs,t[1A(1AX +Kt −Ks)]
= 1AEs,t[1AX +Kt −Ks]
= 1AE
i
s,t[1AX ;K·].
Thus (A4) holds.
By Proposition 2.8, there exists a unique Ft–consistent pricing mechanism
E[·;K], that coincides with Ei[·;K] for each interval [ti, ti+1].
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Definition 6.2 We denote this unique Ft–consistent pricing mechanism that
coincides with Ei[·;K] by Es,t[·;K]:
Es,t[X ;K] : X ∈ L
2(Ft)→ L
2(Fs).
Remark 6.3 It is easy to check that, for each accumulated contingent claim
(X,K) with maturity t and K ∈ D0F(0, t), the only consistent price of (X,K)
of the pricing mechanism E is Es,t[X ;K]0≤s≤t.
Proposition 6.4 We assume that Es,t[·]0≤s≤t<∞ is a given pricing mechanism
satisfying (A1)–(A5) and (A40). Then for each K ∈ D2F (0,∞) there exists a
pricing mechanism Es,t[·;K]0≤s≤t<∞ which is dominated by Egµ in the following
sense, for each K, K ′ ∈ D2F (0,∞) and for each 0 ≤ s ≤ t, X, X
′ ∈ L2(Ft), we
have
E
−gµ
s,t [X −X
′; (K −K ′)·] ≤ Es,t[X ;K·]− Es,t[X
′;K ′· ] (6.3)
≤ E
gµ
s,t[X −X
′; (K −K ′)·], a.s.
and
E
−gµ
s,t [0;K·] ≤ Es,t[0;K·] ≤ E
gµ
s,t[0;K·] (6.4)
Moreover, for each Kt =
∑N−1
i=0 ξiI[ti,ti+1)(t), we have
Es,t[X ;K·] = Es,t[X +Kt −Ks], ∀[s, t] ∈ [ti, ti+1]
Such pricing mechanism is uniquely defined. Furthermore, under the pricing
mechanism E the price process of the accumulated contingent claim (X,K) with
maturity t is Es,t[X ;K·], s ≤ t.
The prove of this proposition can be found in [43].
7 E[·;K]–martingales
Hereinafter, Es,t[·] will be a fixed Ft–consistent pricing mechanism satisfying
(A1)–(A5) and (A40). Similar to E
g
s,t[·]-pricing mechanism, we introduce the
notion of E[·;K]–martingale:
Definition 7.1 Let K ∈ D2F (0, T ) be given. A process Y ∈ L
2
F(t0, t1) satisfying
E[ess sups∈[t1,t1] |Ys|
2] <∞, is said to be an E[·;K]–martingales (resp. E[·;K]–
supermartingale, E[·;K]–submartingale) on [t0, t1] if for each t0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ t1,
we have
Es,t[Yt;K] = Ys, (resp. ≤ Ys, ≥ Ys), a.s. (7.1)
We then can apply Eg–supermartingale decomposition theorem, i.e., Propo-
sition 4.13, to get the following result.
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Proposition 7.2 We assume (A1)–(A5) and (A40). Let K ∈ D2F(0, T ) be
given. For fixed t ∈ [0, T ] and X ∈ L2(Ft), the process Y t,X,Ks := Es,t[X ;K], s ∈
[0, t], has the following expression: there exist processes (gt,X,K· , z
t,X,K
· ) ∈ L2F(0, t;R×
Rd) such that
Y t,X,Ks = X +Kt −Ks +
∫ t
s
gt,X,Kr dr −
∫ t
s
zt,X,Kr dBr, s ∈ [0, t], (7.2)
such that
|gt,X,Ks | ≤ µ(|Y
t,X,K
s |+ |z
t,X,K
s |), ∀s ∈ [0, t]. (7.3)
Moreover let Y t,X
′,K′
s := Es,t1 [X
′;K ′], s ∈ [0, t], for some other K ′ ∈ D2F (0, T ),
X ′ ∈ L2(Ft) and let (g
t,X′,K′
· , z
t,X′,K′
· ) be the corresponding expression in (7.2),
then we have
|gt,X,Ks −g
t,X′,K′
s | ≤ µ(|Y
t,X,K
s −Y
t,X′,K′
s |+|z
t,X,K
s −z
t,X′,K′
s |), ∀s ∈ [0, t]. (7.4)
Proof. Since (Y t,X,Ks )s∈[0,t], is an E
gµ [·;K]–submartingale and E−gµ [·;K]–
super–martingale, by Proposition 4.13 and Corollary 4.14, there exists an in-
creasing process A+· ∈ D
2
F(0, t) and A
−
· ∈ D
2
F(0, t) with A
+
0 = A
−
0 = 0, such
that
Y t,X,Ks = E
gµ
s,t[X ; (K −A
+)·] = E
gµ
s,t[X ; (K +A
−)·], s ∈ [0, t]. (7.5)
According to the notion of Eg defined in (4.5), Y t,X,Ks is the solution of the
following BSDE on [0, t]:
Y t,X,Ks = X + (K −A
+)t − (K −A
+)s (7.6)
+
∫ t
s
µ(|Y t,X,Kr |+ |Z
+
r |)dr −
∫ t
s
Z+r dBr
and
Y t,X,Ks = X + (K +A
−)t − (K +A
−)s (7.7)
−
∫ t
s
µ(|Y t,X,Kr |+ |Z
−
r |)dr −
∫ t
s
Z−r dBr.
It then follows that Zt,X,Ks := Z
+
s ≡ Z
−
s , s ∈ [0, t] and thus
−dA+s + µ(|Y
t,X,K
s |+ |Z
t,X,K
s |)ds ≡ dA
−
s − µ(|Y
t,X,K
s |+ |Z
t,X,K
s |)ds,
or
dA−s + dA
+
s ≡ 2µ(|Y
t,X,K
s |+ |Z
t,X,K
s |)ds, s ∈ [0, t] (7.8)
Thus dA+ and dA− are absolutely continuous with respect to ds. We denote
a+s ds = dA
+
s and a
−
s ds = dA
−
s . It is clear that
0 ≤ a+s ≤ 2µ(|Y
t,X,K
s |+ |Z
t,X,K
s |),
0 ≤ a−s ≤ 2µ(|Y
t,X,K
s |+ |Z
t,X,K
s |), dP × dt–a.e.
26
We then can rewrite (7.6) as
Y t,X,Ks = X +Kt −Ks +
∫ t
s
[−a+r + µ(|Y
t,X,K
r |+ |Z
+
r |)]dr −
∫ t
s
Z+r dBr. (7.9)
Thus, by setting gt,X,Kr := −a
+
r + µ(|Y
t,X,K
r | + |Z
+
r |), we have the expression
(7.2) as well as the estimate (7.3).
It remains to prove (7.4). By (A5) of Proposition 4.13 Yˆs = Y
t,X,K
s −Y
t,X′,K′
s
is an Egµ [·;K −K ′]–submartingale and an E−gµ [·;K −K ′]–supermartingale on
[0, t]. Thus we can repeat the above procedure to prove that there exist processes
(gˆ·, Zˆ·) ∈ L2F(0, t;R×R
d) such that
Yˆs = X−X
′+(K−K ′)t− (K−K
′)s+
∫ t
s
gˆrdr−
∫ t
s
ZˆrdBr, s ∈ [0, t], (7.10)
such that
|gˆs| ≤ µ(|Yˆs|+ |Zˆs|), ∀s ∈ [0, t]. (7.11)
But by (7.2) and Yˆs ≡ Y t,X,Ks − Y
t,X′,K′
s , we immediately have
gˆs ≡ g
t,X,K
s − g
t,X′,K′
s , Zˆs ≡ z
t,X,K
s − z
t,X′,K′
s . (7.12)
This with (7.11) yields (7.4). The proof is complete.
Corollary 7.3 Let K1 and K2 ∈ D2F (0, T ) and X
1 ∈ L2(Ft1), X
2 ∈ L2(Ft2) be
given for some fixed 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T and let (gti,X
i,Ki
s , Z
ti,X
i,Ki
s )s∈[0,ti], i = 1, 2,
be the pair in (7.2) for Y ti,X
i,Ki
s = Es,ti [X
i; (Ki)·], i = 1, 2, respectively. Then
we have
|gt,X
1,K1
s −g
t,X2,K2
s | ≤ µ(|Y
t1,X
1,K2
s −Y
t2,X
2,K2
s |+|z
t1,X
1,K1
s −z
t2,X
2,K2
s |), ∀s ∈ [0, t1].
(7.13)
Proof. With the observation
Y t2,X
2,K2
s = Es,t1 [Y
t2,X
2,K2
t1
; (K2)·], s ∈ [0, t1],
it is an immediate consequence of Proposition 7.2.
Corollary 7.4 For each t ∈ [0, T ] and X ∈ L2(Ft), K ∈ D2F(0, T ), the process
(Es,t[X ;K·])s∈[0,t] is also in D
2
F(0, t). If moreover, K ∈ S
2
F (0, T ) (resp. Itoˆ’s
process), then (Es,t[X ;K·])s∈[0,t] is also in S
2
F(0, t) (resp. Itoˆ’s process).
8 E–supermartingale decomposition theorem: in-
trinsic formulation
Our objective of this section is to give the following E–supermartingale de-
composition theorem of Doob–Meyer’s type. Since (Es,t[·])s≤t is abstract and
nonlinear, it is necessary to introduce the intrinsic form (8.1). This theorem
plays an important role in the proof of the main theorem of this paper. It can
be also considered as a generalization of Proposition 4.13. This is a very profond
theorem, the proof can be found in [43, Peng 2005].
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Theorem 8.1 We assume (A1)–(A5) as well as (A40). Let Y ∈ S2F(0, T ) be
an E[·]–supermartingale. Then there exists an increasing process A ∈ S2F (0, T )
with A0 = 0, such that Y is an E[·;A]–martingale, i.e.,
Yt = Et,T [YT ;A·], t ∈ [0, T ]. (8.1)
Remark 8.2 This theorem has an interesting interpretation: the fact that Y ∈
S2F(0, T ) is an E[·]–supermartingale means that if Y is always undervalued by
the pricing mechanism E, i.e., Et,T [YT ] ≤ Yt, then there exists an increasing
process A such that Yt is just the E price of the accumulated contingent claim
(YT , A) at maturity T .
Remark 8.3 In the case where (Es,t[·])0≤s≤t≤T is a system of linear mappings,
(8.1) becomes
Yt +At = Et,T [YT +AT ], t ∈ [0, T ],
i.e., as in classical situation, Y + A is an E[·]–martingale. But, the intrinsic
formulation that can be applied to nonlinear situation is that Y is an E[·;A]–
martingale.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
For each fixed (t, y, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R × Rd, we consider the solution Y t,y,z ∈
S2F(0, T ) of a Itoˆ’s equation on [t, T ]:
dY t,y,zs = −gµ(Y
t,y,z
s , z)ds+ zdBs, s ∈ (t, T ], (9.1)
Y
t,y,z
t = y. (9.2)
It is easy to check that Y t,y,z is an Egµ [·]–martingale, i.e., it is a price process
of the pricing mechanism Egµ [·] on [t, T ]. Since the pricing mechanism E[·]
is dominated by Egµ [·], from (3.1) Y t,y,z is also an E[·]–supermartingale. By
Decomposition Theorem 8.1, there exists an increasing process At,y,z ∈ S2F (0, T )
with At,y,z0 = 0, such that
Y t,y,zs = Es,T [Y
t,y,z
T ;A
t,y,z
· ]. (9.3)
i.e., Y t,y,z· is just the pricing process produced by E[·] of the accumulated con-
tingent claim (Y t,y,zT ;A
t,y,z
· ) with maturity T . By Proposition 7.2 and Corollary
7.3, there exists ( gt,y,z, Zt,y,z) ∈ L2F(0, T ) such that
− dY t,y,zs = dA
t,y,z
s + g
t,y,z
s ds− Z
t,y,z
s dBs, s ∈ [t, T ], (9.4)
and such that, for each different (t, y, z), (t′, y′, z′) ∈ [0, T ]×R×Rd
|gt,y,zs − g
t′,y′,z′
s | ≤ µ|Y
t,y,z
s −Y
t′,y′,z′
s |+µ|Z
t,y,z
s −Z
t′,y′,z′
s |, s ∈ [t∨ t
′, T ], (9.5)
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and
|gt,y,zs | ≤ µ|Y
t,y,z
s |+ µ|Z
t,y,z
s |, s ∈ [t, T ], ds× dP–a.e. (9.6)
Now for each X ∈ L2(Ft′), we set
Y¯ t
′,X
s := Es,t′ [X ] = Es,t′ [X ; 0]. (9.7)
We use once more Proposition 7.2 and Corollary 7.3: there exists ( g¯t
′,X , Z¯t
′,X) ∈
L2F(0, t
′) such that, for s ∈ [0, t′],
− dY¯ t
′,X
s = g¯
t′,X
s ds− Z¯
t′,X
s dBs, Y¯t′ = X, (9.8)
such that
|gt,y,zs −g¯
t′,X
s | ≤ µ|Y
t,y,z
s −Y¯
t′,X
s |+µ|Z
t,y,z
s −Z¯
t′,X
s |, s ∈ [t, t
′], ds×dP–a.e. (9.9)
and, for X , X ∈ L2(Ft′),
|g¯t
′,X
s − g¯
t′,X′
s | ≤ µ|Y¯
t′,X
s − Y¯
t′,X′
s |+ µ|Z¯
t′,X
s − Z¯
t′,X′
s |, s ∈ [0, t
′], ds× dP–a.e..
On the other hand, comparing to (9.1) and (9.4), we have
Zt,y,zs ≡ 1[t,T ](s)z.
Thus (9.5), (9.6) and (9.9) become, respectively,
|gt,y,zs − g
t′,y′,z′
s | ≤ µ|Y
t,y,z
s − Y
t′,y′,z′
s |+ µ|z − z
′|, s ∈ [t ∨ t′, T ], ds× dP–a.e.,
(9.10)
|gt,y,zs | ≤ µ|Y
t,y,z
s |+ µ|z|, (9.11)
and
|gt,y,zs − g¯
t′,X
s | ≤ µ|Y
t,y,z
s − Y¯
t′,X
s |+µ|z− Z¯
t′,X
s |, s ∈ [t, t
′], ds×dP–a.e. (9.12)
Now, for each n = 1, 2, 3, · · · , we set tni = i2
−nT , i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 2n, and
define
gn(s, y, z) :=
2n−1∑
i=0
g
tni ,y,z
s 1[tni ,tni+1)(s), s ∈ [0, T ], (y, z) ∈ R×R
d. (9.13)
It is clear that gn is an Ft–adapted process.
Lemma 9.1 For each fixed (y, z) ∈ R × Rd and T > 0, {gn(·, y, z)}∞n=1 is a
Cauchy sequence in L2F(0, T ).
Proof. Let 0 < m < n be two integers. For each s ∈ [0, T ), there are some
integers i ≤ 2m − 1 and j ≤ 2n − 1 with tmi ≤ t
m
j , such that s ∈ [t
m
i , t
m
i+1) ∩
[tnj , t
n
j+1). We have, by (9.10)
|gm(s, y, z)− gn(s, y, z)| = |g
tmi ,y,z
s − g
tnj ,y,z
s |
≤ µ|Y
tmi ,y,z
s − Y
tnj ,y,z
s |
≤ µ|Y
tmi ,y,z
s − y|+ µ|Y
tnj ,y,z
s − y|.
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By (5.4) of Lemma 5.1 given later,
E[|gm(s, y, z)− gn(s, y, z)|2]
≤ 2µ2C(|y|2 + |z|2 + 1)(2−m + 2−n)T.
Thus
sup
s∈[0,T )
E[|gm(s, y, z)− gn(s, y, z)|2] ≤ 2µ2E[|Y
tmi ,y,z
s − y|
2 + |Y
tnj ,y,z
s − y|
2]
(9.14)
≤ 2µ2C(|y|2 + |z|2 + 1)(2−m + 2−n)T.
Thus {gn(·, y, z)}∞n=1 is a Cauchy sequence in L
2
F(0, T ).
We can give
Definition 9.2 For each (y, z) ∈ R × Rd, we denote g(·, y, z) ∈ L2F(0, T ), the
Cauchy limit of {gn(·, y, z)}∞n=1 in L
2
F(0, T ).
We will prove that the pricing mechanism Es,t[·] is just the g–pricing mech-
anism with g obtained in the above definition as its generating function, and
thus our main result Theorem 3.1 hold true. We still need to investigate some
important properties of g. We have the following estimates for the function g.
Lemma 9.3 The limit g : Ω × [0, T ] × R × Rd → Rd satisfies the following
properties:


(i) g(·, y, z) ∈ L2F (0, T ), for each (y, z) ∈ R×R
d;
(ii) |g(s, y, z)− g(s, y′, z′)| ≤ µ(|y − y′|+ |z − z′|), ∀y, y′ ∈ R, z, z′ ∈ Rd;
(iii) g(s, 0, 0) ≡ 0;
(iv) |g(s, y, z)− g¯t,X | ≤ µ|y − Y¯ t,Xs |+ µ|z − Z¯
t,X
s |, ∀s ∈ [0, t], X ∈ L
2(Ft).
(9.15)
where (Y¯ t,X , Z¯t,X) is the process defined in (9.7) and (9.8).
Proof. (i) is clear. To prove (ii), we choose tni = i2
−nT , i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 2n as
in (9.13). For each s ∈ [0, T ). We have, once more by (9.10),
|gn(s, y, z)− gn(s, y′, z′)| =
2n−1∑
j=0
1[tnj ,tnj+1)(s)|g
tnj ,y,z
s − g
tnj ,y,z
s | (9.16)
≤ µ
2n−1∑
j=0
1[tnj ,tnj+1)(s)(|Y
tnj ,y,z
s − Y
tnj ,y,z
s |+ |z − z
′|)
≤ µ
2n−1∑
j=0
1[tnj ,tnj+1)(s)(|Y
tnj ,y,z
s − y|+ |Y
tnj ,y,z
s − y
′|)
+ µ(|y − y′|+ |z − z′|)
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The first term In(s) of the right hand is dominated by, using (5.4),
E[|In(s)|2] ≤ 2µ2
2n−1∑
i=0
1[tnj ,tnj+1)(s)E[|Y
tnj ,y,z
s − y|
2 + |Y
tnj ,y
′,z′
s − y
′|2]
≤ 2µ2
2n−1∑
i=0
1[tnj ,tnj+1)(s)C(|y|
2 + |z|2 + |y′|2 + |z′|2 + 2)2−nT.
Thus In(·) → 0 in L2F(0, T ) as n → ∞. (ii) is obtained by passing to the limit
in both sides of (9.16). (iii) is proved similarly by using (9.11) and (5.4).
To prove (iv), We apply (9.12),
|gn(s, y, z)− g¯t,Xs | =
2n−1∑
i=0
1[tnj ,tnj+1)(s)|g
tnj ,y,z
s − g¯
t,X
s |
≤
2n−1∑
i=0
1[tnj ,tnj+1)(s)[µ|Y
tnj ,y,z
s − Y¯
t,X
s |+ µ|z − Z¯
t,X
s |]
≤ µ
2n−1∑
i=0
1[tnj ,tnj+1)(s)|Y
tnj ,y,z
s − y|+ µ|y − Y¯
t,X
s |+ µ|z − Z¯
t,X
s |.
Then we pass to the limit on both sides.
Finally, We give
Proof of Theorem 3.1. For each fixed t and X ∈ L2(Ft), we denote by
Y¯ t,Xs := Es,t[X ], the E-price on s ∈ [0, t] with the contingent Y¯
t,X
t = X at the
maturity X . By Proposition 7.2 and Corollary 7.3, this price process can has
the form
Y¯ t,Xs = X +
∫ t
s
g¯t,Xr dr −
∫ t
s
Z¯t,Xr dBr, s ∈ [0, t].
On the other hand, let Y t,Xs = E
g
s,t[X ], the price process of the contingent claim
X generated by g. It solves the BSDE
Y t,Xs = X +
∫ t
s
g(r, Y t,Xr , Z
t,X
r )dr −
∫ t
s
Zt,Xr dBr, s ∈ [0, t].
By Lemma 9.3–(i) and (ii), this BSDE is well–posed. We then apply Itoˆ’s
formula to |Y¯ t,X − Y |2 on the pricing interval [0, t], take expectation. Exactly
as the classical proof of the uniqueness of BSDE, we have, using (iv) of Lemma
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9.3.
E|Y¯ t,Xs − Ys|
2 + E
∫ t
s
|Z¯t,Xr − Zr|
2dEr
= 2E
∫ t
s
(Y¯ t,Xr − Yr)(g¯
t,X
r − g(r, Yr, Zr))dr
≤ 2E
∫ t
s
(|Y¯ t,Xr − Yr| · |g¯
t,X
r − g(r, Yr, Zr)|)dr
≤ 2E
∫ t
s
|Y¯ t,Xr − Yr| · µ(|Y¯
t,X
r − Yr|+ |Z¯
t,X
r − Zr|)dr
≤ E
∫ t
s
2(µ+ µ2)|Y¯ t,Xr − Yr|
2 +
1
2
|Z¯t,Xr − Zr|
2)dr.
It then follows by using Gronwall’s inequality that
Y¯ t,Xs ≡ Ys = E
g
s,t[X ], ∀s ∈ [0, t].
We thus have the desired result. The proof is complete. 
9.2 Testing condition of domination (A5)
with computational realization by CHEN Lifeng and SUN
Peng
With Chen and Sun of our research group, we have applied our main re-
sult 3.1 to test if a specific pricing mechanism is a g–expectation, or g–pricing
mechanism. We need to verify by testing if the crucial assumption (A5), i.e.,
the domination inequality (3.1) holds true. We have tested by using the data of
prices of different options given by the price mechanism.
We first test the CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange)’s market price mech-
anism of the options with S&P500 futures as the underlying asset. The data
of the call and put priceses, from year 2000 to 2003, and the corresponding
S&P500 future’s prices is obtained from the parameter files of SPAN (Standard
Portfolio Analysis of Risk) system downloaded from CME’s ftp site.
We denote by X iT = (ST − ki)
+ (resp. Y iT = (ST − ki)
−, the market price
of the call (resp. put ) option with muturity T and strike price ki. We de-
note their market price at time t < T by Emt,T [X
i
T ] and E
m
t,T [Y
i
T ], respectively.
The inequalities we need to put to the test are (3.1) in the following different
conbinations, with different (t, T ) and different strike prices


Call–Call: Emt,T [X
i
T ]− E
m
t,T [X
j
T ] ≤ E
gµ
t,T [X
i
T −X
j
T ]
Put–Put: Emt,T [Y
i
T ]− E
m
t,T [Y
j
T ] ≤ E
gµ
t,T [Y
i
T − Y
j
T ]
Call–Put: Emt,T [X
i
T ]− E
m
t,T [Y
j
T ] ≤ E
gµ
t,T [X
i
T − Y
j
T ]
Put–Call: Emt,T [Y
i
T ]− E
m
t,T [X
j
T ] ≤ E
gµ
t,T [Y
i
T −X
j
T ]
(9.17)
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In the above inequalities the left hand are market data taken from CME
parameter files. The right hand are the corresponding gµ–expectations. We
have calculated all these values by using standard binomial tree algorithm of
BSDE. Here use the algorithms in Peng and Xu [2005] to solve the following
1-dimensional BSDE:
yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
µ(|ys|+ |zs|)ds−
∫ T
t
zsdBs (9.18)
yT = X
i
T −X
j
T (resp. Y
i
T − Y
j
T , X
i
T − Y
j
T and Y
i
T −X
j
T ).
5 parameter files from year 2000 to 2003 have been put in the test. We list
the number of tested inequalities (9.17) corresponding to each CME parameter
file:
CME parameter file name year number of tested inequalities
cme0105s.par 2000 54584
cme0105s.par 2001 62424
cme0104s.par 2002 35830
cme0103s.par 2003 28162
cme0701s.par 2003 61438
total number tested 242438
This means that BSDE (9.18) have been caculated 242438 times (with CPU
P4 Xeron 2.8G). A surpricingly positive result was obtained: among the to-
tally 242438 tested inqualities, only 5 are against the criteria (9.17). Moreover,
those 5 counterexamples are singular situation since they themself all violate
Axiomatic monotonicity condition (A1). 5 cases are all from cme0701s.par,
2003, Put–Put. They are all the singular cases of form
E
m
t,T [(ST − ki)
−] > Emt,T [(ST − kj)
−], for ki > kj .
More specific results of the test will be given in our forthcoming paper.
Another feature of our test is, usualy, the bigger T−t is, the E
gµ
t,T [X
i
T−X
j
T ]−
(Emt,T [X
i
T ] − E
m
t,T [X
j
T ]). We present 4 features for a relatively smaller T − t to
show the tested result.
Test of inequalities: CME file: cme0105s.par, 2001, t: Jan. 05, T : Jan. 17
for S&P500 01-03 future with St = $1413.5
1. Call–Call: E
gµ
t,T [X
i
T −X
j
T ]− (E
m
t,T [X
i
T ]− E
m
t,T [X
j
T ]) > 0
2. Put–Put: E
gµ
t,T [Y
i
T − Y
j
T ]− (E
m
t,T [Y
i
T ]− E
m
t,T [Y
j
T ]) > 0
3. Call–Put: E
gµ
t,T [X
i
T − Y
j
T ]− (E
m
t,T [X
i
T ]− E
m
t,T [Y
j
T ]) > 0
4. Put–Call E
gµ
t,T [Y
i
T −X
j
T ]− (E
m
t,T [Y
i
T ]− E
m
t,T [X
j
T ]) > 0
Remark: the computations was realized by CHEN Lifeng and SUN Peng
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